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The article focuses on the debatable issues of Russian-American relations from 1914 until the 
fall of Tsarism, such as the degree of the two countries’ rapprochement, ethnic questions, the 
positive dynamics of mutual images and the intensified process of Russians and Americans 
studying each other. Based on primary and secondary sources, this work intends to emphasize 
that the conflict element in bilateral relations did not hamper cooperation between the two 
states. The author’s multipronged and interdisciplinary approach allowed her to conclude that 
the United Sates was ready to engage in wide-ranging interaction with the Russian Empire 
regardless of their ideological differences. From the author’s point of view, it was the pragmatic 
agenda that aided the states’ mutual interest in destroying the stereotypes of their counter-
part and stimulated Russian Studies in the US and American Studies in Russia. Therefore, the 
“honeymoon” between the two states had started long before the 1917 February Revolution. 
However, Wilson strove to turn Russia not so much into an object of US’ “dollar diplomacy”, 
but into a destination of its “crusade” for democracy. The collapse of the monarchy provided 
an additional impetus for liberal internationalism by integrating the Russian “Other” into US 
foreign policy. Ultimately, an ideological (value-based) approach emerged as a stable trend in 
structuring America’s attitude toward Russia (be it the Soviet Union or post-Soviet Russia).
Keywords: the Russian Empire — US relations, WWI, Russian-American rapprochement, mu-
tual images.
Introduction
The history of relations between the Russian Empire and the United States during 
World War I has usually been researched in conjunction with the February Revolution 
since the ascendant cooperation peaked in spring of 1917. 
Benson Grayson’s book [1] remains the only specialized study of Russia — US rela-
tions in the years of the US’ neutrality; he confines himself to diplomatic relations and 
bases his exploration on the well-known State Department records and ambassadorial 
memoirs. This monograph contributed little to understanding the logic and dynamics of 
bilateral relations as they have been represented in the books of William Williams and 
John Gaddis. Williams, a New Left historian, was a proponent of economic determin-
ism in his American-Russian Relations 1784–1947 [2], although his book The Tragedy of 
* This article has been prepared with the financial support of The Russian Science Foundation (RNF), 
project No. 20-18-00482 “Transformations of the Supremacy Ideas in the West and in Russia at the late 
19th — early 21st centuries”.
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American Diplomacy emphasized the important of a Weltanschauung that included cul-
tural and religious dimensions and could not be reduced to economic ambitions [3]. In his 
turn, Gaddis, who was close to realism in the 1970s, placed particular emphasis on inter-
governmental interactions viewed through the prism of interests and ideologies in the 
foreign policy of both states [4]1. Additionally, books by Soviet historians Rafail Ganelin 
and Vyacheslav Lebedev offer higher-quality analyses and a wider source base, although 
Grayson’s book is less tendentious. In the meantime, Soviet historiography stressed trade 
and economic relations as well as conflict areas in Russia — US relations [5; 6].
At the turn of the 21st century, studies of Russia — US relations were given a new 
impetus largely by Norman Saul’s fundamental monograph. Using Russian and Ameri-
can primary sources, the book’s first two chapters present an original and multi-faceted 
analysis of interactions between the Russian Empire and the US [7, p. 1–102]. The same 
descriptions cannot applied to Vyacheslav Shatsillo’s work that substantially bases on well-
known primary and secondary sources and combines old interpretational patterns with 
the contemporary propaganda discourse [8]. The most recent books also include Dale 
Rielage’s study where he demonstrates that late Imperial Russia failed to make full use of 
the American market for its military needs. Rielage fits the issue of military supplies from 
overseas producers into a larger context of interactions between the Tsarist bureaucracy 
and civil society to confirm the argument that “neither group could effectively guide Rus-
sia through the challenges of the new century” [9, p. 4].
Even though new studies continue to appear, debatable issues remain, including the 
degree of the two countries’ rapprochement in 1914 — early 19172; the special significance 
of ethnic questions that cannot be reduced to the “Jewish” question alone; the positive 
dynamics of images, and the intensified process of Russians and Americans studying each 
other. This article will focus on these aspects as it intends to emphasize that the conflict 
element in Russian-American relations did not hamper the two states’ rapprochement 
that started two years before the February Revolution. 
Conflict context of bilateral relations
World War I (1914–1918) was caused by clashing geopolitical and economic inte- 
rests, unresolved colonial disputes, and nationalistic ambitions. The emergence of two 
military political blocs, the Entente and the Central Powers, as well as the arms race speed-
ed up the start of the global conflict, although historians continue to debate the propor-
tion of regularities and incidents in the process. 
Despite its dynastic and economic ties with Germany, the Russian Empire found itself 
in the same camp as liberal western states, Great Britain and France. This development 
was owing to contradictions with the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Balkans, allied re-
lations with France, and settlement of colonial disputes with Great Britain, while the latter 
two states viewed the German Empire as their principal adversary3. 
1 The first edition of his book Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States was published in 1978. 
After the 1970s Gaddis became “post-revisionist”.
2 The post-Soviet historiography continued to insist that conflict areas were dominant and the negative 
dynamics of images subsisted. See, for example [10, p. 140–144].
3 Among the most recent important works see: [11].
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On the eve of the war, President Woodrow Wilson’s views of Russia centered on the 
tension between humanitarian ideals and economic interests and in 1911, he contributed to 
the campaign for abrogation of the Russian-American commercial treaty of 1832, defend-
ing American ideas of religious freedom and civil equality [12, p. 26–29; 13, p. 879–912]. 
After Wilson was elected US President in 1912, it became clear that Russia was not 
among foreign political priorities of the Wilson Administration whose first steps concern-
ing Russia were its protracted attempts to appoint a new US ambassador to Russia. It took 
16 months, to the displeasure of the government of Nicholas II4. In May 1914, citing fami- 
ly reasons, Russophile Charles Crane declined Wilson’s offer of the post [14, p. 106–110]. 
The next attempt failed as well, so the new ambassador was appointed only in May. It was 
George Marye, a businessman from San Francisco, who arrived in Russia only in October 
1914, when World War I was already underway. 
Wilson’s liberal idealism and the amateurish nature of the US foreign policy regularly 
prompted caustic remarks from George Bakhmetev, Russia’s Ambassador to the US. How-
ever, with his typical pragmatism, he wrote to Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs that 
“these are only secondary phenomena and despite these developments, the US with its 
tremendous and steadily increasing natural wealth… will remain a major factor that is 
but a short distance away from us in the east and with whom we can at any time develop 
common and important interests” [15, p. 397].
Following the outbreak of military hostilities in Europe, the US proclaimed its neu-
trality and initially interacted with both blocs. Wilson, who took control of America’s 
foreign policy, and Edward House, his personal advisor and political consultant usually 
called Colonel House (even though he did not hold the military rank), were wary both of 
Germany emerging victorious and of Russia establishing its hegemony in Europe should 
the Entente win. Later, there were concerns about the possibility of a separate Russian-
German peace treaty and of an anti-democratic Germany-Russia-Japan alliance emerging 
[16, p. 432, 316, 459, 184; 4, p. 54; 17, 133–154]. 
St. Petersburg, renamed Petrograd in August 1914 owing to the anti-German cam-
paign, viewed the US neutrality as Germanophilism and as a desire to profit from the war. 
Additionally, Washington agreed to represent German and Austro-Hungarian interests in 
the Russian Empire and to handle the issue of their prisoners-of-war, thereby bolstering 
Russia’s perception of America’s German sympathies. The timing of the new ambassador’s 
arrival also appeared suspicious as he was installed in the office two years after the res-
ignation of the former one and exactly at the time when Germany and Austro-Hungary 
asked that the US represent their interests [18, p. 17–18]. On August 3, 1914, Washington 
instructed the US Embassy in the Russian Empire to act on behalf of the Central Powers, 
although Chargé d’Affaires Charles Wilson advised the Department of State against this 
course of action [19, p. 26–27]. 
The wave of anti-German sentiments resulted in persecution and public ostracism of 
the Singer Sewing Machine Company; it was accused of espionage since it was associated 
with Germany and employed many Germans. Its offices and shops were attacked and shut 
down, and the government temporarily took control of its factory in Podolsk due to the 
charges of harboring German spies. The company suffered serious losses and, in order 
4 Novoe Vremya, (1914), January 14/27.
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to improve the corporate image, some of its facilities switched to military production [7, 
p. 12–14].
The Imperial Court and the government were particularly displeased with Wilson’s 
mediation policy which he had been viewing as special mission of the US since the start 
of the war. The first attempts at mediation undertaken by the Department of State on 
direct instructions from the President in September 1914 prompted both confusion and 
annoyance in the capitals of the warring states. Colonel House’s European tours of 1915–
1916 produced no results, yet they helped monitor the proposals of Europe’s most astute 
politicians that Wilson took into account in his project for a new system of international 
relations. Incidentally, House never got as far as the Russian Empire, and not only due to 
his state of health, but because neither the president, nor his advisor viewed Russia as a 
partner in the talks on the outline of the new world order. Moreover, House found it dif-
ficult to shed his view of Germany as a buffer protecting Europe from the Russian threat 
[17, p. 155–182]. 
By 1916, Wilson had fully developed the notion that international relations had to 
be restructured to be based on a “new diplomacy” that would be open and respectful of 
sovereign rights of all nations. Hence his note sent to the warring states on December 18, 
1916 suggesting that they proclaim their goals in the war; and hence his address to the US 
Congress on January 22, 1917 suggesting “peace without victory.” Wilson thereby transi-
tioned from secret mediation to public diplomacy.
George Bakhmetev, who called Wilson the “Self-Proclaimed President of the Uni-
verse” and a “new Don Quixote” meddling in others’ affairs, nonetheless called Petrograd 
to give a sympathetic response since Russia was interested in American loans and military 
supplies5 [15, p. 645]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Imperial Court, and the govern- 
ment press viewed Wilson’s messianic peacemaking as an insult and as Germanophil-
ism, because his initiatives supposed that both warring blocs had identical interests [20, 
p. 84–87]. 
Even the liberal Russian press condemned Wilson’s attempts to stop the war with-
out the Entente’s victory. Pavel Milyukov, the leader of the the Kadets (the Constitutional 
Democratic party), stressed that while the principles laid down by the US President could 
serve as a foundation for future peace negotiations, “peace without victory” was out of the 
question. In his turn, the progressive nationalist Vasily Shulgin welcomed the US desire 
for democratic peace without annexations and contributions, yet said that talks “can only 
begin after the Allies’ decisive victory”6. The Kadets did not criticize Wilson for the neu-
tral US stance, although they were interested in seeing Americans on the side of the En-
tente7, while progressivists explained the US policy as a desire to profit as much as possible 
through military supplies and to weaken both Germany and Great Britain as America’s 
principal economic competitors8.
Conflict in Russia — US relations stemmed from three ethnic questions: the “Slavic,” 
the “Polish,” and the “Jewish” ones. The first two proved to be directly related to Wilson’s 
5 Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiiskoy Imperii (AVPRI), Fond (F). 133. Kantselyariia MID, Opis’ (Op), 
470, Delo (D). 62, List (L). 2.
6 Utro Rossii, (1917), January 11.
7 Rech’, (1914), November 6/19; (1915) January 9/22, March 15; (1916), November 1; Russkaya Mysl’, 
(1916),No. 9.
8 Vestnik Evropy, (1915),No. 7–8, p. 273, 30; Utro Rossii, (1915), August 22, October 11; (1916), May 
24; (1917), January 25.
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vision of the post-war world order that, in his opining, would be impossible without put-
ting into practice the “national self-determination” principle and the latter was linked to a 
long-standing ideological conflict9.
Starting with the first years of the war, the Tsarist government following its Pan-Sla- 
vic program strove to counteract German and Austro-Hungarian propaganda among the 
Slavic population in the US. The stance of America’s Czechs, Slovaks, and Southern Slavs 
was important for the Russian Empire, since Washington conducted a two-edged policy. 
On the one hand, the US attempted to drive a wedge between Austro-Hungary and its 
German ally; on the other hand, to stimulate democratic reforms in Austro-Hungary it-
self giving account to every people’s right to choose the form of sovereignty best suited 
for it. This policy brought Wilson the votes of the immigrant community in the US at the 
1912 and 1916 elections. His stance on the issue of Austrian Slavs’ future, first, created 
a precedent of interfering into domestic ethnic policies, and second, it delivered a blow 
to the Slavic geopolitical programs of both the Tsarist and the Provisional Governments 
geared toward preserving the territorial integrity of multi-ethnic Russia as a guarantee of 
its political power [22, p. 41, 49, 84; 23, p. 12–17; 24, p. 56–114].
Anthony Volf, the Russian consul in Chicago, played an exceptionally important role 
in collecting and collating information on the Slavic movement in America since his place 
of service was the largest center of Slavic immigration and home to the majority of their 
leading organizations. Volf was supported by the military agent Colonel Nikolay Goleevs-
ky and advocated establishing a pro-Russian Slavic Alliance in the US; Russia’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs supported Volf over the opposition of Ambassador George Bakhmetev 
who deemed support for Slavs a useless and risky venture10 [15, p. 319–321, 324–328, 
330, 338–340]. In his turn, N. N. Kratirov, an Embassy staffer and author of the “Slavs 
in America” analytical memo, stressed Slavs’ real contribution to unmasking the actions 
of Austria’s Ambassador Konstantin Theodor von Dumba and Germany’s Ambassador 
Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff11. On the whole, Russia missed an opportunity to put 
Czechoslovak organizations across the Atlantic under her control. 
The war advanced the internalization of the “Polish question.” This process had several 
principal stages: Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolaevich’s manifesto of August 2/15, 1915 where-
by creating a united, free, autonomous Poland was proclaimed to be one of the goals of the 
war; the Central Powers’ Manifesto of November 5, 1916 proclaiming the establishment of 
an independent Poland in Russian lands occupied by Austro-Hungary and Germany; the 
Provisional Government recognizing the independence of Poland as a state in a “free mili-
tary alliance with Russia”; western allies’ statements of a united and independent Poland. 
Of special significance here were Wilson’s address to the Senate of January 22, 1917 call-
ing for “peace without victory” and his subsequent Fourteen Points speech, since both of 
them moved the “Polish question” to the level of high diplomacy [25, p. 105–130]. 
While the government of Nicholas II conceived of this question as part of the ethnic 
and religious problem of Russia’s political development, for Wilson, this question became a 
way of implementing the idea that the US had a special mission to protect smaller European 
nations’ rights to national self-determination [26, p. 367, 404–406, 414, 421–422, 29–30, 72, 
9 See about it in details: [21, p. 215–243].
10 AVPRI, F. 170. Posol’stvo v Vashingtone, Op. 512/I, D. 393, L. 12, 51; D. 401, L. 2–7; D. 417, L. 2–9; 
F. 135. Osobyi politotdel, Op. 474, D. 352, L. 53, 57; D. 343, L. 34–38, 59 ob.–64.
11 AVPRI, F. 135, Osobyi politotdel, Op. 474, D. 364, L. 1–84.
278 Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2021. Т. 14. Вып. 3
79–81, 106, 368–371, 396–397, 432–433]. In a memo written in early 1917, Ivan Korostovets, 
a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Council and an experienced diplomat who had 
accompanied Sergei Witte to Portsmouth in 1905, pointed out that the differences between 
Petrograd and Washington in interpreting the “Polish question” constituted one of the prin-
cipal obstacles in the way of the mutual rapprochement [15, p. 648]. In their turn, leaders of 
the Polish community in the US had real influence on Wilson and House’s stance in the “Po- 
lish question” [24, p. 122–130]. The four million people in the Polish diaspora itself were split 
into pro-German and pro-Russian camps and contributed to shaping the public opinion in 
the US, thus boosting America’s role as a defender of Polish interests.
The US policy in the “Polish,” “South Slavic,” and “Czechoslovakian” questions was 
transformed into a mechanism for implementing the principles of the Wilsonian diplo-
macy and resulted in a clash between two messianisms, the Russian one based on eth-
nic and religious principles and the ideas of pan-Slavism, and the American one geared 
toward disseminating democratic ideals. This clash did nothing to improve the bilateral 
relations. At the same time, the sentiments among Slavic communities in the United States 
were a fairly stark illustration of the Russian Empire’s declining influence among Slavs.
The “Jewish question” remained a stumbling block, although the war made adjustments 
to it as well, shifting emphases and adding important nuances. German propaganda in the 
US used the stories of the “horrors of Jewish pogroms and rioting” in the war-ravaged Po-
land as its trump card. The tone was set by The Day, a newspaper published in New York 
and edited by Herman Bernstein, an Austrian Jew and a former secretary of the American 
Jewish Committee. He acted in close contact with Germany’s Ambassador von Bernstorff 
and expressed the interests of German Americans, particularly Jews [15, p. 307–308]. In 
January-February, the media disseminated von Bernstorff ’s letter to Bernstein. The letter 
reported major pogroms in 215 towns and cities of Russian Poland and outrages perpetrated 
by Russian soldiers. This information was accompanied by letters from victims of violence in 
Warsaw, Kibarty (in today’s Lithuania), and Brody (in today’s Ukraine) [26].
At the start of the war, there were, indeed, anti-Jewish riots in Poland, and anti-Se-
mitic sentiments among Russians were on the rise as well, although information about 
large-scale pogroms was an open provocation. The Jewish population was forcibly evacu-
ated from war-struck areas, which resulted in their mass arrival into Warsaw and other 
Polish cities. These developments, in turn, prompted resentment of Russians and Poles 
that translated into violence. The overcrowded Jewish ghetto in Warsaw also became a 
temporary refuge for those American Jews who had traveled to Russia in summer to visit 
their relatives. Later, they were allowed to return home [7, p. 10–11, 38–39].
The “Jewish question” was now spurred on by refugees’ stories and continued 
to negatively affect the bilateral relations and the perception of Russia in the United 
States. M. V. Rutkovsky, an agent of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, stressed that prac-
tically minded Americans considered it abnormal to prohibit freedom of movement be-
yond the pale of settlement12 [15, p. 308–310].
The persistent difference in stances made it impossible to conclude a new Russian-
American commercial treaty to replace the denounced one even though both parties 
wanted to do it and deliveries of American goods were increasing. Both George Marey 
and David Francis failed in this task, even though both viewed concluding the agreement 
12 AVPRI, F. 134, Arkhiv “Voina”, Op. 473, D. 42, L. 234-236.
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as their principal objective13 [18, p. 40; 27, p. 13–16, 18–19, 28–30, 49–50]. On the one 
hand, the Russian government held fast to its position in the “passport conflict.” Without 
being able to protect the passports of Jewish American citizens, the Department of State, 
accordingly, rather quickly abandoned its attempts to negotiate a commercial treaty being 
justifiably concerned about the prospects of having this treaty ratified by the Senate. On 
the other hand, this issue was no longer quite as urgent with the military hostilities going 
on, since Russia — US economic and trade relations were developing successfully without 
a treaty. Russia’s exports into the US fell, while imports from the US were exclusively with-
in the purview of governmental agencies. Modi vivendi and short-term agreements served 
as alternatives to a new treaty [5, p. 27–28; 7, p. 17, 64, 73; 1, p. 48, 53–54, 78; 28, p. 22–27]. 
During World War I, Jewish activists and like-minded non-Jews in the US succeeded 
in retaining certain influence over public opinion. However, given the two states’ rap-
prochement and the re-structuring of mutual perceptions, a real opposition emerged in 
the US to the American-Jewish lobby. Additionally, there were still hopes of Russia’s dis-
criminatory policies being liberalized, inspired by Russian symbolic gestures: Nicholas II 
accorded a Jewish delegation a favorable reception; the most egregious trials against Jews 
doing business beyond the pale of settlement were aborted; Russian generals visited syna-
gogues; and Jews were now being given state awards. However, the hopes for more sub-
stantial changes were never fulfilled.
Despite tensions over the treatment of ethnic minorities and geopolitical and ideo-
logical issues, Russia and the United States developed unprecedented interaction in trade 
and economy as well as in the humanitarian area. 
The wartime cooperation between the Russian Empire and the US
Initially, the outbreak of military hostilities in Europe resulted in a drop in American 
imports to Russia, since over half of exported goods was delivered via Germany and then 
re-exported to the Russian Empire. However, the war opened up an opportunity for a 
large-scale expansion of direct Russia — US trade and financial contacts.
In the Russian Empire, these developments were supported by Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sergei Sazonov; in 1914, he pointed out to Chargé d’Affaires Charles Wilson that 
the US could take Germany’s place on the Russian market. Another supporter was Finance 
Minister Petr Bark, who started looking for US loans in the very first months of the war. 
Already in October 1914, acting on Bark’s instructions, Witte visited the US Embassy in 
Petrograd where he said “in strictest confidence” that the Russian government was inter-
ested in his travelling to the US to negotiate a large loan for Russia. Although Washington 
saw it as an opening for concluding a new commercial treaty, Robert Lansing (at that time 
still a counselor to the Department of State) stressed that given the US neutrality it could 
not issue loans to parties at war. Witte soon passed away, and Bark continued, through-
out 1915 and 1916, to actively negotiate loans with J. P. Morgan’s Guaranty Trust and the 
National City Bank in New York. Their representatives traveled to Petrograd and fought 
each other for control of the “Russian business” [5, p. 10–15, 34–44, 50–80]. 
In 1915, the Kadets in the 4th State Duma, joined by Octobrists from the right wing 
of Russian liberalism and centrist Progressives, formed the Progressive Bloc. Its members 
13 New York Time, (1914), July 3.
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advocated forming a responsible government that would be able to extricate Russia from 
a series of military failures, welcomed American investments and railroad construction 
and banked on an alliance with the US and on its aid. The proponents of an active Rus-
sia — US rapprochement in trade and in modernization of Russian economy included the 
Octobrist Alexander Guchkov, the Chairperson of the Central War Industry Committee, 
the Kadets Pavel Milykov and Andrey Shingariev, the progressive Maksim Kovalevsky14, 
as well as such statesmen and entrepreneurs as Vladimir Kovalevsky, Deputy Minister of 
Finance in Witte’s cabinet, and Vasily Timiryazev, the Minister of Trade and Industry in 
1905–1906 and 1909.
American consuls and journalists called upon their fellow citizens to step up the ex-
pansion of goods and capitals across the Atlantic, since, following Germany’s withdrawal 
from the Russian market, it could be taken over not only for the duration of the war, but 
for good, they hoped15 [7, p. 14–15]. US entrepreneurs enthusiastically engaged in talks 
with the emissaries of the Tsarist government discussing possible sales of train cars, weap-
ons, gun powder, military uniforms, sugar, and medical products. 
In the first months of the war, various ministries started sending their agents to the 
US to sign contracts. That is why a Commission was formed at the Embassy in the spring 
of 1915 with a view to coordinating their activities. As the volume of orders from various 
ministries increased, the Commission expanded its membership. It acted as an interme-
diary for placing orders worth 450  million dollars that Russia was paying for without 
recourse to loans [6, p. 14–24].
In October, the Russian Procurement Committee led by Major General Alexey 
Sapozhnikov was finally established in New York to make direct purchases in the US. The 
Committee included emissaries of ministries and Zemstvos. Initially, its activities were 
sharply criticized on both sides of the Atlantic, since military procurement essentially 
broke down due both to objective reasons, such as the absence of a developed military 
industry in the US and financial problems, and to subjective matters. The inexperienced 
Sapozhnikov established ties with American suppliers of dubious reputation who later 
proved to be swindlers and profiteers; he spent much time socializing, and some members 
of the Committee used the situation for their own profit [29, p. 29–36]. 
In July 1916, Sapozhnikov was replaced with Lieutenant General Anatoly Zaliubovs-
ky, who uncovered the principal reasons that impeded the procurement. He believed that 
the problem on the Russian side was the membership of the Committee that did not have 
experienced engineers and firearms experts, lawyers to be in charge of the legal aspect of 
the contracts, and entrepreneurs with a good knowledge of the American market. Addi-
tionally, there was a shortage of available ships, and most importantly, regular shipping of 
orders to Russia had not been set up. The obstacles on the American side consisted in most 
American factories being technologically unprepared to execute complex and large mili-
tary orders and in the fact that competing British and French orders were given priority 
over Russian ones. Zaliubovsky poured significant effort into reorganizing the activities 
of the Russian Procurement Committee [6, p. 205–209; 15, p. 743–746; 30, p. 8–16, 24–27, 
121–127]. 
14 Birzhevye vedomosti, (1915), December 5/18; Utro Rossii, (1915), August 30, November 2, Decem-
ber 2; (1916), May 14, 30; Golos Moskvy, (1915), May 23.
15 Washington Post, (1915), March 15; The Boston Transcript, (1915), March 1915; Journal of Com-
merce, (1915), March 20.
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Financing Russian orders placed in the US and paying for them became a serious 
problem. In January 1915, the Tsarist government received a loan of 25 million rubles 
from an American bank group; this loan, however, was not enough to meet Russia’s needs. 
Since September, following the signing of a contract in London, Russian military orders 
placed in the US were financed with British loans, which made Russia financially depend-
ent on Great Britain and on J. P. Morgan’s Guaranty Trust representing Great Britain’s in-
terests. In 1915–1917, deliveries for contracts concluded by Morgan in the capacity of the 
British commercial agent accounted for 44 % of all American exports. From November 
1916, the Russian Procurement Committee was granted the right to place orders directly, 
without Morgan’s intermediary services [5, p. 19–21, 148].
Intensified Russia — US relations during the war required that the staff of the US 
Embassy in Russia be renewed and expanded. In January 1916, the decision was made to 
replace Ambassador George Marye. He was well-liked at the Imperial Court, but Wilson 
thought him to be too pro-Entente. His replacement had to be a more energetic person ca-
pable of taking the Russia — US relations to a new level [31, p. 67, 442, 511]. The President 
chose the 65-year-old David Francis, a St. Louis newspaper publisher, former mayor of 
the city, governor of Missouri, and former United States Secretary of the Interior, who was 
equally unfamiliar with the art of diplomacy and with Russia. However, Wilson liked his 
extensive experience in both politics and life, his energy, and business acumen and, most 
importantly, his firm conviction that the US had a special mission in the world. In their 
turn, American Russophiles in the US and in Petrograd clued him into the state of affairs 
in Russia. In January-June 1916, new valuable Embassy staffers arrived in Petrograd, such 
as William Huntington as a commercial attaché, a career foreign service officer Joshua 
Butler Wright as counselor, and Livingston Phelps as first secretary [7, p. 62–71]. 
In the spring of 1916, Ambassador Francis, having rightly concluded that J. P. Mor-
gan’s Guaranty Trust served the interests of Great Britain, encouraged Samuel McRoberts, 
the vice president of the National City Bank of New York, to come to Russia. The latter 
arrived together with the bank’s second vice president to agree on a loan and on opening 
the bank’s branch in Russia. In Russia, this plan was promoted by Ivan Korostovets, who 
was certain that only the American capital was capable of relieving Russia’s financial war-
time burden and acting as a counterbalance to its financial and economic dependence on 
Russia’s allies [15, p. 218].
Following the talks, the syndicate of New York banks extended to the Tsarist go- 
vernment a credit of 50 million dollars against 150 million rubles deposited in the Impe-
rial Russian Bank. At the same time, an arrangement was finally achieved on opening in 
January 1917 in Petrograd a branch of the National City Bank with a capital of 50 mil-
lion dollars. In November 1916, the syndicate sold on the American market Russian state 
treasury obligations up to the amount of 25 million dollars [5, p. 99–106, 115–116, 127]. 
In their publications and public speeches, McRoberts and commercial attaché William 
Huntington stressed that exports of American goods would go hand in hand with build-
ing factories and investing in various economic sectors. Following his return to the US, 
McRoberts launched a media campaign for a “commercial crusade” to the Russian Em-
pire16 [32, p. 18–81].
16 Vestnik Russko-Amerikanskoi Torgovoi Palaty (1916), No. 12; No. 8, p. 342, 221.
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Despite all the obstacles and Russia’s financial dependence on Great Britain, the US 
succeeded in setting up deliveries of supplies to Russia, including war materials, railroad 
equipment, medicines, machine tools, and metals. And even though this success took defi- 
nite efforts and costs. And even though the Tsarist government ultimately failed to make 
full use of the opportunities afforded by the overseas market, American firms became 
the principal suppliers of rifles and machine guns, ammunition, powder and explosives, 
cars and motor bikes for the Tsarist army. Trucks, tanker trucks, and buses were exported 
solely from the US. After it received additional equipment and materials from overseas, 
the Singer Sewing Machine Company made an important contribution, too, organizing 
large-scale production of uniforms and shells at its Podolsk factory. Several production 
facilities at the International Harvester plant in Liubertsy were also converted for military 
needs manufacturing grenades [6, p. 164–167, 174–202, 233–237; 7, p. 20–26, 66, 74–75; 
8, p. 148–163; 30, p. 28–120].
Between August 1914 and March 1917, the Russian Empire received 233 million dol-
lars in direct American financial aid; additionally, J. P. Morgan’s Guaranty Trust extended 
1,480 million dollars in loans. Seventy percent of the loans extended to Great Britain and 
France was used to provide for Russian war supplies [4, p. 52]. Between 1914 and 1916, 
American exports increased from 27 million dollars to the unprecedented 500 million 
dollars. Absolute figures show that while lagging behind Great Britain and France in the 
volume of its trade with the US, Russia was certainly a leader in growth pace. Compared 
to the pre-war figures, the Russia — US trade grew by 1,157 % and it continued to grow 
after the February Revolution [5, p. 21–22]. 
The activities of the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce established in Mos-
cow back in 1913  made an important contribution to developing trade and economic 
relations and deepening mutual understanding between the two states [33, p. 233–236]. 
During the war, the Chamber opened its offices in Petrograd, Kiev, and Tashkent, operated 
with support from the Ministry of Finance as well as the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
and advocated for a Russia — US business partnership. Since January 1915, it launched its 
Bulletin that often published articles by a Deputy Chairperson of the Chamber, Ivan Oze-
rov, an economist and a staunch promoter of American capitalist development experience 
and Russia — US economic rapprochement17.
In August 1915, Alexander Behr, another Deputy Chairperson of the Chamber, ar-
rived in the US. He held talks on opening a counterpart chamber in the US and on es-
tablishing a Russian-American bank. Speaking in New York at the International Trade 
Conference and calling for the development of relations based on mutual benefit, and not 
on politics, Behr said, “Russia stands before you not as a petitioner, but as a welcoming 
hostess opening a door to her innumerable riches” [34, p. 87, 90, 96–97]. Upon his return, 
he reported American industrialists, merchants, and financiers’ tremendous interest in a 
trade partnership with Russia. And although the bank was never opened, Behr’s visit cer-
tainly furthered Russia-US trade and economic rapprochement. 
The American-Russian Chamber of Commerce under the leadership of Charles 
Boynton was opened in February 1916 in New York. Boynton was married to a Russian 
and maintained close ties with the Russophile Melville Stone, the director of Associated 
Press. The Chamber’s membership comprised representatives of the largest US banks, in-
17 Vestnik Russko-Amerikanskoi Torgovoi Palaty (1915), no. 1, p. 3–5; Russkoe Slovo, (1916), May 25/
June 7.
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dustrial, and trade corporations; Konstantin Medzykhovskii, the agent of Russia’s Mini- 
stry of Trade and Industry, became its honorary member. Both chambers were in close 
contact, although they obeyed the laws of different states, and regularly published articles 
and reference materials on Russia’s and the US’ economic development [34, p. 124–134, 
142–145, 150–159].
The Society for Promoting Mutual Friendly Relations between Russia and America 
was founded in Petrograd in 1915 [34, p. 81–85]. The Society was led by Roman Rosen, 
Russia’s former ambassador to the US. Its establishment was spearheaded by its subse-
quent vice chairperson Nikolay Borodin, a statistician, economist, ichthyologist, and a 
Kadet in his political views. He first visited the US during the 1893 World Fair in Chicago 
and since then, he became an active proponent of using the American experience in Rus-
sia. Between December 1915 and February 1918, the Society, whose founders included 
many well-known Russian left-wing and centrist liberals, published five issues of Izvestiia 
(News-Bulletin) on the prospects of Russian-American cooperation. For example, in the 
1916 September issue, Borodin emphasized “the colossal Russia-America trade turnover 
which led to increased steamer traffic in the Atlantic” and unprecedented scale of lecture 
courses and well-informed articles about each other18. 
Bilateral relations were intensifying. Both Washington and Petrograd realized that 
many problems could be solved only by developing direct business contacts. These con-
tacts were given a new impetus after the February Revolution and the US joining the war 
in April 1917, when the renewed Russia and the North American republic seemed to find 
themselves on the same side of the military fight for advancing democracy. 
World War I expanded the agenda of the Russia — US interaction by adding hu-
manitarian issues [15, p. 790–800; 19, p. 1013, 1019–1023; 28, p. 55–56; 7, p. 36–47; 35, 
p. 113–118].
Americans participated in philanthropic fundraising for Russian refugees fleeing the 
near-front areas and for Russian prisoners-of-war in Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Tur-
key. The money collected through Orthodox Church organizations and at various events, 
as well as the goods purchased were sent to the Russian Empire, to charities working un-
der the patronage of Empress Dowager Maria Fedorovna and to the Russian Red Cross. 
The American Red Cross played an important part in raising funds and organizing medi-
cal aid; it sent to Russia groups of doctors, nurses, and caregivers supplied with required 
medical products and hospital equipment. Members of the Young Men’s Christian As-
sociation (YMCA) acting in close collaboration with the evangelical youth organization 
Mayak (lighthouse) also aided the wounded. 
Mayak was established in Petrograd before the war and led by Franklin Gaylord. John 
Mott, a proponent of a rapprochement between Russian and American branches of Chris-
tianity, also had ideological and organizational influence on the development of the evan-
gelical youth movement in Russia [35, p. 20–21, 43–47].
In winter of 1915–1916, the US started aiding German and Austro-Hungarian priso- 
ners-of-war in Russian camps located around Kiev and to the east of Moscow, along the 
Trans-Siberian Railroad. This matter was agreed on in the personal correspondence bet- 
ween Wilson and Nicholas II. Russia insisted on “full reciprocity.” Therefore the US made 
an arrangement with Spain that represented the interests of Russian prisoners-of-war in 
18 The News-Bulletin of the Society for Promoting Mutual Friendly Relations between Russia and 
America, (1916), No. 3, September, p. 2.
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Germany and Austro-Hungary for American organizations to provide those POWs with 
aid identical to that provided to the Central Powers’ POWs in Russia.
Americans inspected camps and supplied prisoners with money, medications, and 
other aid paid for primarily by their own governments. In spring of 1916, the Second 
Division of the Embassy was formed to distribute aid among German and Austrian priso- 
ners of war. The division was housed in the building of the former Austrian embassy in 
Petrograd. Initially, it was headed by Edward Devine, a Columbia University professor of 
social welfare and a philanthropy expert. In the fall, he was replaced by Basil Miles who 
had formerly been on the Embassy staff during the Russo-Japanese war and consequently 
had valuable expertise.
The American Red Cross and YMCA actively assisted in handling the humanitarian 
issues. Since the Second Division’s jurisdiction was limited to European Russia and West-
ern Siberia, a special American Red Cross Unit assisted by the YMCA provided medica-
tions and clothes to camps in Central and Eastern Siberia. These camps left over since the 
Russo-Japanese war were notorious for their particularly harsh conditions. The YMCA 
also aided in distributing governmental charity sent from the US, while the YMCA’s War 
Prisoners’ Aid section regularly provided organizational and informational assistance to 
the Second Division.
Aiding Austrian and German prisoners-of-war was a complicated and delicate activi- 
ty, especially since many German-speaking social workers made local authorities suspect 
them of being spies. Americans were helped by the fact that since 1915  they had been 
providing similar aid to Russian prisoners of war in Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman 
Empire. The Tsarist government, though, allocated incomparably smaller funds for sup-
porting POWs, which resulted in higher mortality rates. Finally, the US played the key 
role in selecting among “Austrian” prisoners those Slavs (Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs) who were 
willing to fight on the side of Russia or their own nations. Thus the war added the humani-
tarian dimension to the Russia — US cooperation.
Dynamics of mutual representations
During World War I, the interstate agenda featured the question of destroying mutual 
stereotypes and myths as well as of disseminating knowledge about each other. The Rus-
sia — US rapprochement created favorable conditions for the intended developments as it 
was conducive to expanding the range of mutual images. The “Russian message” received a 
powerful response in the US, as did the “American message” in Russia.
The American journalists and columnists repeatedly said that the US did not know 
the true Russia. In 1916, Richard Child, a military correspondent, lawyer, and subsequent-
ly a diplomat, wrote: 
We know so little about Russia and that little we know is so distorted! We know about spies, 
and secret police, ballets, massacres, exile to Siberia, the Jewish question, bureaucratic graft, 
and much of what we know is not so. We know a Yellow Russia. Most of our immigrants from 
Russia are not representative of Russia. They are not even Slavs… More than that, most of the 
Americans who go to Russia and come back to report are not representative of the United States; 
they are adventurous journalists seeking to find the sensational mysterious Russia of the moving 
picture scenario, and adventurous commercial agents who cannot speak the Russian language 
[36, p. 186–187].
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Child called upon his fellow citizens to be more tolerant of the peculiar features of the 
Russian Empire’s development and of such “sore points” as the Jewish question, especially 
since Americans were interested in taking cooperation with Russian further. Child called 
upon Russians to abandon their simplified notions of the US as a country of smokestacks 
and of Americans as a people obsessed with money-making. 
Back in June 1915, Alexander Kokhanovsky, the management officer of the Russian 
consulate in San Francisco, bemoaned the fact that the US had long gotten used to “saying 
negative things” about Russia [15, p. 613]. However, already by 1916, Joseph Loris-Melikov, 
the First Secretary of Russia’s Embassy in the US, after his travel around the country drew 
the opposite conclusion. In his substantial memorandum “On a Russia — US Rapproche-
ment” he wrote that Americans had previously affected by stories of cruel Jewish pogroms, 
about the horrors of exiles to Siberia and of persecutions of Finns, “now are willing to 
listen to real-life descriptions of Russian valor, our Motherland’s spiritual and economic 
power” [15, p. 620]. Agreeing with Loris-Melikov, Bakhmeteff stated in July 1916 that Rus-
sians “have become the focus of Americans’ admiration and hopes” [15, p. 632].
Russophiles with ties to the Crane circle were expanding their ranks and were very 
active in constructing positive perceptions of Russia. They included Samuel Harper who 
regularly traveled to Russia and studied it with the financial support from Crane; Isabel 
Hapgood, a renowned translator and popularizer of the Russian culture; Norman Hap-
good, an adherent of Wilsonian internationalism, the editor of Collier’s and Harper’s 
Weekly (which Crane owned since May 1913); Elizabeth Reynolds, the first Russian in-
structor at Columbia University, where she worked since 1915. Later she married Norman 
Hapgood and founded the Russian department in Dartmouth in 1918. There were also 
many others. For example, Wharton Barker, a businessman from Philadelphia and an old 
friend of Russia, who continued to publish articles in support of Russia in the local and 
central press, highlighting contribution to the fight against the German militarism. Barker 
suggested to Nicholas II and Sergei Sazonov that they use his connections and resources 
for the good of Russia, and from time to time he acted as an intermediary between various 
American firms wishing to receive contracts to supply goods and weapons to Russia and 
the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C.19
These people had different personalities, views, and talents, but they were united in 
their belief in the great future of the Russian people, in their desire to introduce Ameri-
cans to the culture and history of Russia, and in their negative attitude to the anti-Russia 
propaganda of the American-Jewish community. They published many articles in news-
papers and magazines, and gave public lectures in universities and clubs. Some, like the 
liberals Harper and Crane, welcomed the Russian Empire’s participation in World War I 
while believing in the renewed “Milyukov’s Russia.” Others, like the conservative Isabel 
Hapgood, “distanced herself from Slavophile critics of westernization and welcomed the 
anticipated adoption of the Gregorian calendar, which she asserted Americans had has-
tened” [37, p. 49]. 
Crane was the most influential among them. He did not seek an official position on 
the Wilson Administration, but he knew both the President and Colonel House well. 
Additionally, Crane’s son Richard was appointed personal secretary to Robert Lansing. 
Crane had the key role in Wilson’s decision to replace George Marye with David Francis. 
19 Letters of Wharton Barker to Nicolas II and Sergei Sazonov see in Library of Congress, Manuscript 
Division, The Wharton Barker Papers, Box 12.
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The latter went to Russia in April 1916 accompanied by Harper. Crane covered his travel 
expenses and had convinced the President that Harper was best suited for the mission 
since he knew Russia well and had connections in governmental, liberal and revolution-
ary circles. In Petrograd, Harper introduced Francis to his Russophile friend Frederick 
Corse, the head of the New York Life Insurance Company in Russia and President of the 
American club of the city, who was very active in the American colony’s charitable work in 
Petrograd. Francis himself was a member of the board of directors of New York Life where 
his son was a regional manager. Corse became one of the new ambassador’s key advisors 
[14, p. 128–135].
On the whole, the emphases in the American perceptions of Russian were clearly 
shifting in 1914–1916 for several reasons [13, p. 998, 1001–1002, 1007–1011; 37, p. 47–50; 
7, p. 27–31]. 
First, the public and political discourse was constructing a new demonic “Other,” 
the German one that came to replace the Russian “Other.” Instead of the Russian Tsar 
Nicholas II, American cartoons now featured Emperor Wilhelm II in the role of a barbaric 
soldier with a bloodied saber. Anti-German sentiments had been rising among the Ameri-
can public since the war broke out. The exception was the anti-Entente groups of ethnic 
Germans, Irish, Poles, and Jews. Two factors influenced the spread of Germanophobia: 
Germany’s barbarian warfare methods regularly covered by the press, and Germany’s at-
titude to the seafaring rights of neutral states, which became clear after the Lusitania was 
sunk on May 7, 1915 [38, p. 231–275].
Second, there was a rising number of articles on Russia’s fidelity to its allies despite its 
military defeats in the first year of the war, on its ability to rise from its knees and deliver 
crushing blows to the enemy as it did in the Brusilov Offensive in June-September 191620. 
American war correspondents, including Stanley Washburn, who had ties to the Crane 
circle, made a major contribution to the shaping of such an assessment. Their articles were 
accompanied with photographs and illustrations, and they contributed to creating Russia’s 
positive image in the US and to bolstering mutual fellow-feelings. The journalists did it for 
professional purposes, in order to maintain good relations with the Russian authorities, 
thereby being able to supply diverse information to their publications, and due to their 
sincere impulses and belief in the renewal of the Russian Empire [7, p. 42–50].
Third, the American public was increasingly convinced that the war would be the 
driver of Russia’s liberalization contributing to its transformation into a worthy partner of 
western powers fighting against the “German barbarity.” Since fall of 1914, George Ken-
nan was inspired by the prospects of the Russian Empire’s renewal. He believed that the 
war had consolidated all of Russia’s progressive forces. Kennan even abandoned his pes-
simistic view of peasants and objected against the opinion voiced by New York’s Mayor 
George McClellan Jr. that Russians’ “civilizational code” did not allow them to be counted 
as a European people. Telling Americans about the internal democratism of the Russian 
peasants with their common sense and self-government ability, Kennan was assuring 
them that the war would end in a revolution in the Russian Empire. The question was only 
whether it could possibly be political and non-violent. And although Kennan’s enthusiasm 
had somewhat wilted by fall of 1915 due to the news that the convocation of the Duma had 
20 The Literary Digest (1915), August 14, p. 250–251; (1916), June 24, 1833; July 1, 11; Outlook (1915), 
February 3, p. 263; The North American Review (1916), April, p. 431–436; Review of Reviews (1915), Octo-
ber, p. 437; (1916), July, p. 56–64.
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been postponed, he was not prepared to easily abandon his newly revived faith in creating 
a free Russia21 [39, p. 316–348]. 
In fall of 1916, Nicholas Butler, the Columbia University President, writing under the 
penname Cosmos, published a series of articles in The New York Times. He depicted Rus-
sia as a kind of a bridge between the old East and the new West, a country that was steadily 
traveling the path of westernization [40, p. 48–53; 41, p. 641–680]. Already in 1914, some 
American observers heard the “murmuring sound of the building of a new democracy”22.
Americans’ belief in Russia’s speediest transformation was further buttressed by 
Nicholas II’s decree of August 1914 banning sales of alcohol. In America, the decree was 
perceived as a symbol of Russians’ awakening from “the spell of alcoholism,” since drink-
ing had been seen as one of the main causes of the backwardness of the Russian Empire 
[42, p. 102–104]. The American press dubbed this decree “a true miracle” and ranked it 
on par with reforms of Peter I and Alexander II. Isabel Hapgood stressed that this reform 
was inspired by the US with its temperance movement. Characteristically, in Russia itself, 
the reform’s supporters among westernizers appealed to the American methods, while 
its supporters among Slavophiles referred to Russia’s own teetotalist practices citing Old 
Believers and Muslims [8, p. 67–68; 43, p. 4]. Women participating in the warfare on par 
with men confirmed the positive shifts in Russia as well. 
These inspired contexts stimulated a search for large-scale parallels in the two coun-
tries’ development, which evidenced desire of politicians and journalists, public figures 
and preachers to exaggerate both the scale of Russia’s reforms and the degree of American 
influence on their making. Additionally, Russians were expected not to radically demolish 
their past in a revolution, but to gradually refurbish their state23.
The Tsarist government undertook its own steps to adjust Russia’s image in the US 
by sending Sergei Syromiatnikov, a well-known conservative writer and public figure, to 
America in early 1915 [44, p. 143–160]. Being fluent in English, he published a series of 
articles explaining the stance of the imperial government on the war matters and on Rus-
sia’s domestic policies. For that purpose, he also set up a Russian-Slavic Translation Bu-
reau. American press disseminated Syromiatnikov’s appeals to perceive Russia through 
its history, soul, and thoughts that accorded with the discourse of America’s conservative 
Russophiles. 
In his turn, Iosef Loris-Melikov wrote that it was necessary to educate Americans not 
only through the printed word and cinema, but also by setting up academic exchanges 
involving university professors: “Our young people have certainly much to learn from 
Americans, but the latter would be glad to absorb from Russian academics that elevated 
and deeply aesthetic spirit that imbues our literature and science. Even now, there are 
societies and circles cropping up in various places in America that set themselves the goal 
of studying Russia, its language, the spirit of its people, its learning, and arts” [15, p. 631].
In 1915–1916, the Russian press published increasing numbers of articles calling for 
creating a diverse image of the United States that would not be confined to stereotypes 
perpetrated, for instance, by pulp fiction like Nat Pinkerton crime stories. A Literary Di-
gest review of the Russian press focused on the many articles that postulated the need to 
21 Outlook (1914), October, p. 377–380; (1915), March, p. 767–770.
22 Craftsman (1914), November.
23 New York Times (1917) January 15; The Literary Digest, (1916), November 27, p. 1216; December 6, 
p. 1528; (1917), February 10, p. 330–331.
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expand knowledge of various aspects of American life. For instance, the Novoe Vremya 
newspaper called for establishing closer business ties between the two states and stated 
that Russians did not have much knowledge of America, while America had even less 
knowledge of Russia. The Russkoe Slovo newspaper, in its turn, stressed that those who 
cherished Russia’s interests and wanted to contribute to the development of its productive 
forces should spare no efforts to advance closer ties between the Russian Empire and the 
US based on mutual concessions and understanding24.
In February 1917, Boris Shatsky, an adjunct professor at Petrograd University, was 
sent to New York to establish a Russian information bureau that would educate Ameri-
cans about Russia and Russians about America. He arrived already after the February 
Revolution and, together with Arkady Zak, who worked for the Ministry of Finance, he 
succeeded in setting up the work entrusted to him, switching gears to protect the interests 
of the young Russian democracy25 [7, p. 112–115]. 
The new agenda of bilateral relations gave a new impetus to the development of Rus-
sian studies in the US and of American studies in Russia. This interest manifested in creating 
specialized university departments, offering courses, and publishing articles and books [7, 
p. 52–58; 45, p. 65–72; 46, p. 45–76]. Leo Wiener, one of the pioneers of Russian studies in 
the US working in Harvard, published a book in 1915 calling for unbiased study of Russia. 
He suggested that the Russian Empire be perceived through the lens of its fine arts, music, 
and religion, its public, political, and philosophical thought, poetry, and literature. Wiener 
also traced the influence of American democratic drives both on sociopolitical ideals and 
on the music culture, stressing, however, their other manifestations in the Russian cultural 
milieu [47, p. 10, 14–15, 17, 95, 99]. 
The development of Russian Studies in wartime could be seen in the growing num-
bers of students in Slavistics classes in Berkeley and Harvard and in the establishment of 
the Slavic Department in Columbia University in 1915 together with a specialized Russian 
language course being offered there. John Dyneley Prince, Columbia University’s Profes-
sor of Semitic and Slavic languages, became one of the principal proponents of developing 
Russian studies. He was close with the Crane circle, gave lectures on Russia, and partici-
pated in the fundraising effort for the Russian Red Cross. The number of students in his 
Slavic history course increased from 6 in 1913–1914 to 39 in 1915. They were also taught 
the Russian language26. Together with Mihajlo Pupin, a well-known Serbian-American 
physicist, and Elizabeth Reynolds, Prince enthusiastically supported the idea of establish-
ing a Russian Studies Сenter at Columbia University; this idea was advocated by Syromi-
atnikov. The latter called for setting up student exchanges that would allow young people 
to obtain more valid and diverse knowledge by attending universities of the country they 
studying27. At the same time, Crane promised financial support to the Russian Studies 
Сenter at Columbia and continued to promote Russian studies in Chicago University. He 
granted Harper a four-year contract for travelling to Russia, teaching Russian, and giving 
lectures on Russian history and continued to finance guest lecturers and purchasing books 
for the library [14, p. 128]. 
24 Literary Digest, (1916), August 5, p. 295–296; Henderson, A. (1916), The Russia  — US Rappro- 
chement, Novoe Vremya, September 24.
25 AVPRI, F. 170, Posol’stvo v Vashingtone, Op. 512/I, D. 525, L. 0033–0036.
26 New York Times, (1915), March 25.
27 New York Tribune, (1915), April 10.
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In 1914, the young American Slavist Frank Golder travelled to Russia to work in its 
archives and then published a unique and still relevant Guide, focusing on Moscow’s and 
Petrograd’s archives [48]. Golder himself viewed the publication of this edition as the first 
step in establishing professional ties between Russian and American scholars, as a start 
of the process of exchanging ideas, materials, and people in Russian Studies in the US 
and American Studies in Russia [49, p. 3–86]. In addition to Berkeley, Harvard, Chicago 
and Columbia Universities, Russian language, history, and culture were also taught in 
Michigan and Missouri. In 1916, a Russian Department was opened at Seattle University. 
Nikolay Bogoyavlensky, the consul for Nome and Seattle, saw it as “Russia’s peaceful vic-
tory” that was important for developing of bilateral relations since Seattle was the gateway 
of the America’s trade with Eastern Siberia28.
The study of the US received a new development impetus in Russia, saving, however, 
its applied character. The Moscow historian Stepan Fortunatov increased the number of 
his students by adding those from Moscow Higher Women’s Courses. Addressing them, 
he stressed that “if we speak of the interests of the masses, and not individual persons, the 
US has reached the highest level of material wealth, mental development, and happiness 
that no other nation in Europe has achieved,” although Americans still had to resolve 
the racial question and overcome the extremes of its capitalist development and wealth 
inequality [50, p. 44–45, 226]. 
However, it was Nikolay Borodin who made the most energetic contribution to de-
veloping American studies at that time. He incessantly emphasized the importance of 
Americans’ achievements for developing Russia’s productive forces and for its revival. In 
particular, he wrote: 
It is our profound conviction that we have no other road to travel in our development than the 
road of North America; we need to study it, use its experience and strive to attract its tremendous 
capitals and technical means so that Americans would work together with Russians on exploring 
Russia’s untapped natural resources and on developing Russia’s weak industry on a large scale29.
In 1915, Borodin published two books on the US where he discovered similarities in 
the two states’ development and concluded that Russia needed to use not only the Ameri-
can socioeconomic experience, but also the lessons of federalism. Although Borodin idea- 
lized the US, which was generally typical for Russian liberal westernizers, he criticized its 
political corruption, its venal press, and mentioned the existence of negative phenomena 
in economic and social life. Yet these judgments, too, led him to see the American model 
of development in a positive light due to its reformist characteristic. Borodin believed that 
constructive reforms were what allowed Americans to regenerate their society. This was 
something Russians should also learn from them [51; 52].
October 1917 was a turning point in the development of both American studies in 
Russia and Russian studies in the US. In the former case, progressive development was 
interrupted, ideological pressure resulted in condemning to oblivion many works of pre-
revolutionary scholars and columnists. American studies would come to be conditioned 
by the radical discourse defined by the Marxist paradigm instead of the previously domi-
nant liberal universalist one. In the US, the heyday of the Russian studies would be linked 
28 AVPRI, F. Posol’stvo v Vashingtone, Op. 170, D. 408, L. 3–5 ob., 7–7 ob.
29 The News-Bulletin of the Society for Promoting Mutual Friendly Relations between Russia and Ame- 
rica, (1915), No. 1, December p. 2–3.
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to the names of Russian émigré historians such as George Vernadsky (Yale University), 
Mikhail Karpovich (Harvard University), Michael Florinsky (Columbia University), who 
brought to their classrooms not only knowledge but also a specific message which was 
both antimonarchic and anti-Bolshevik and tended toward the liberal-universalist socio-
political discourse which now also became an academic discourse [53, p. 25, 93–95, 92].
Conclusion
A study of the relations between Tsarist Russia and the US during World War I indi-
cates that the North American republic was ready to engage in wide-ranging cooperation 
with the Russian Empire regardless of their ideological differences. So the “honeymoon” 
between the two states had started long before the 1917 February Revolution.
The Russia — US rapprochement was unprecedented in its scale primarily in trade, 
economy, and finances, and it continued to expand. Russia needed military supplies de-
liveries from the US as well as American capital and experience to continue the war and 
modernize its economic system. That was the grounds for the initial rapprochement bet- 
ween the stance of the government and that of the opposition in Russia. In its turn, the 
US was changing its status in the international table of ranks, was building up its global 
industrial and financial power, and was interested in a large-scale economic expansion 
into the Russian market. Thus a pragmatic dimension of the bilateral relations emerged 
that was also aided by the states’ mutual interest in destroying each other’s stereotypes of 
their counterpart and in studying each other.
However, Wilson strove to turn Russia not so much into an object of the US’ “dollar 
diplomacy,” as into a destination of its “crusade” for democracy. The collapse of the monar- 
chy provided an additional impetus for liberal internationalism by integrating the Rus-
sian “Other” into the US’ foreign policy. Ultimately, an ideological (value-based) approach 
emerged as a stable trend in structuring America’s attitude toward Russia (be it the Soviet 
Union or post-Soviet Russia).
However, that would transpire later. Thus far, Russia was moving toward another revo- 
lution and the US, in turn, was moving toward another cycle on hopes concerning the 
prospects of Russia’s modernization and of disappointment over its results.
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